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Philosophical discussions frame the problem of race as either a social or an historical one; 
race is rarely diagnosed as a problem in philosophy. This article employs African 
philosophical writings to capture the distinctiveness of philosophical racism. I offer some 
remarks on the concept of race, distinguish between social and philosophical racism, and set 
out African diagnoses of Western philosophical racism before considering possible responses 
to these diagnoses. I reject a blanket anti-racist prescriptivism and instead urge individual 
adoption of a research maxim that is responsive to opportunities for philosophical race 
reform as they arise within any domain of philosophical inquiry.      
 
 
I. Racial Justice and Philosophical Racism 
Reading a draft of Charles Mills’ searching contribution reminded me of two unrelated 
remarks made by two different thinkers in tangentially connected contexts. One is Thomas 
Nagel’s comment, in ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, that ‘the global situation is so grim that 
justice may be a side issue’. (Nagel, 2005, p. 114) Although it caused much consternation, 
Nagel’s claim is hardly contentious that the theoretical and practical antecedents of liberal 
justice may be too demanding to render it applicable to current global conditions (Flikschuh, 
2017, chp. 1). I have similar reservations in relation to the idea of racial justice: the problem 
of racism, too, is so grim – in the sense of being so all-pervasive – that framing it exclusively 
or even only predominantly as an issue of social justice may be misleading: too much about 
race would have to be regarded as settled for us to be able to think of it as a problem 
confined to social justice.1  
The second tangentially related remark comes from Russel Berman’s book, 
Enlightenment or Empire, which examines incipient colonial discourses in the travelogues of 
the late Enlightenment (Berman 1998). In the concluding chapter, entitled ‘The Myth of 
Anti-Colonialism’, Berman takes issue with radical alterity studies when he argues that there 
is no alternative to the painstaking dissection of ambivalent colonial legacies within 
inherited mainstream intellectual traditions. Mills, too, sets aside what he calls the 
revolutionary ambitions of radically deconstructivist race studies in favour of a ‘boringly 
reformist’ approach that seeks to accommodate racial justice within Rawlsian liberalism. I 
nonetheless read Berman’s point somewhat differently: for him, there is no alternative to 
our scrutinizing our mainstream philosophical discourses for the complex colonial and racial 
legacies they contain; radical alterity studies are premised on unavailable notions of new 
beginnings. Since we can never simply wipe the slate clean, scrutiny of the errors of the past 
is a lesson in humility with regard to our present philosophical thinking, which remains no 
less liable to error, prejudice and even bigotry than that of our philosophical predecessors. 
 My chief worry about framing the problem of race exclusively in terms of social 
justice is that it precludes us from entertaining the possibility of racism as a problem in 
philosophy. Philosophical racism is distinct from social racism. While the latter requires 
institutional and attitudinal reform, the former is embedded deep within inherited 
                                                      
1 Mills recognizes this. Towards the end of his article he distinguishes between six different 
dimensions of racial justice: ‘economic, juridico-political, cultural, cognitive-evolutionary, 
somatic, ontological’. But why categorize all of these as dimensions of racial justice?   
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structures of thought and language. If, as Mills intimates, race as a social problem requires 
philosophical resources for its resolution, we ignore race as a philosophical problem at our 
social peril (relatedly, see Fricker, 2009). I am here nonetheless primarily interested in 
philosophical racism as a possible problem for the discipline itself. Our philosophical 
thinking may continue to bear the marks of a racist philosophical tradition. To the extent to 
which it does, this is worrisome independently of its implications for social justice – it puts 
the discipline’s self-conception into doubt. At the same time, it is peculiarly difficult to 
diagnose and to account for philosophical racism as distinct from manifestations of personal 
or social racism in the discipline. Were leading philosophers in the Western tradition voicing 
more than personal prejudice when they interspersed their philosophical tracts with 
derogatory comments about non-Europeans? Would the ways in which Western 
philosophical thinking conceives and frames its central concerns – in epistemology, say, or in 
metaphysics – have been appreciably different if the issue of race had not entered this 
thinking ever more insistently from the 17th century onward (Mudimbe, 1988; Smith, 2015)? 
What is distinctive about philosophical racism compared to personal or social prejudice, and 
how can one account for its presence philosophically as opposed to historically, say, or 
politically (Eze, 2008)? 
 Although he does not raise these questions directly, the first half of Mills’ article 
touches upon them when he highlights the distinctiveness of race as a socially 
discriminatory concept compared to other such concepts, like ‘gender’ or ‘class’. In what 
follows, I shall largely set aside Mills’ subsequent exploration of the potential of Rawlsian 
social justice in relation to African-American experiences of social racism. I have no 
expertise in that domain – my own interests are in modern African philosophy. Yet whilst 
being black is not, for obvious reasons, a social problem in most contemporary sub-Saharan 
polities, the historical experience of philosophical racism remains a live concern. In Section 
II, I supplement Mills’ discussion of the concept of race with some preliminary remarks on 
‘racism’ in general and on ‘philosophical racism’ more specifically. Section III considers some 
of the ways in which modern African philosophers have diagnosed philosophical racism in 
the Western tradition; section IV asks how we might begin to confront it. I briefly return to 
the issue of racial justice in conclusion, indicating some of the ways in which engaging the 
wider question of philosophical racism may impact our approach to the narrower problem 
of racial injustice. Evidently, the problem here broached is very large and the available space 
severely limited; this brief article is unavoidably exploratory in nature. I do not have a firm 
grasp of what philosophical racism may be and of how one might go about either diagnosing 
or remedying it. This does not mean that it is not an issue worth thinking about more than 
we currently do.  
 
II. Race, Racism, and Philosophical Racism 
For Mills, the elusiveness of what he calls the concept’s objective or ontological referent 
renders racial justice itself elusive: if we cannot identify which features within our social 
world the concept of race picks out, we cannot achieve racial justice through the 
elimination, rectification or, alternatively, the social acceptance of those features. In 
consequence, racial injustice itself is elusive – it appears to occur nowhere and everywhere 
at the same time. It is often difficult to distinguish race-based discrimination from other 
forms of social discrimination and difficult to determine in any particular instance whether a 
victim suffered abuse on grounds of race or on other grounds. Equally, it is difficult for those 
who hold racist attitudes and beliefs to give a clear account of why they hold these beliefs. 
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Feminists may protest that Mills exaggerates the distinctiveness of race in this 
respect. Gender injustice is similarly pervasive, affecting all aspects of male and female 
relations. Mills’ contention that the classification of human persons into male and female 
stands on firmer, because biological grounds is contestable: for one thing, as Mills 
acknowledges, race used to be accounted for in terms of perceived biological determinants; 
for another, basing gender divisions on biological determinants is increasingly viewed as 
problematic. The elusiveness of its objective referent may not be unique to race as a 
discriminatory concept.2  
Mills in any case goes on to dismiss the concept’s disputed ontological status as 
practically irrelevant. From a practical or political perspective, what matters is not whether 
the concept of race picks out any real differences between groups of humans but whether 
or not it is believed to do so. The belief that it does is most likely false; however, what 
matters for practical purposes is its social efficacy. I am not wholly persuaded by this 
argument. Presumably, a belief is socially salient in part because it was once held to be true 
(or justified). It is difficult to imagine that belief in racial differences would have gained 
social salience if most of those who affirmed it had also regarded the belief as groundless. 
By the same token, beliefs that come to be regarded as false or unjustified typically lose 
social salience over time. For example, belief in the existence of witches has salience in 
social contexts where that belief is held to be true but lacks it in contexts in which it has 
come to be regarded as false (Oluwole 1978). To the extent to which the concept of race 
retains salience in a given social context, it must have been held to be true (or justified) in 
that context at some point. The belief may be false but, generally speaking, it would be 
irrational for people to uphold, over time, the social salience of beliefs which they 
acknowledge to be false or groundless.3 
 Prejudicial belief may come close to being socially sustained false belief.4 Prejudicial 
belief cannot be true belief as it would then not be prejudicial.5 Nor can it be sincerely held 
                                                      
2 I nonetheless concur Mills on this issue: it is hard to specify what exactly renders racial 
divisions more arbitrary than gender-based divisions – but the sense remains that social 
discrimination based on skin colour is even less justifiable than that based on reproductive 
functions. Not all anti-feminism is misogynistic in inception and intent – but all racism 
arguably is bigoted, and most probably intentionally so. 
3 My problem with the view of race as a ‘social construction’ is that the diagnosis is 
performed over the heads of those who hold racists beliefs. The latter will not, presumably, 
offer as reasons for their racists beliefs the fact that their belief is socially constructed. Even 
if they appeal to the fact that everyone around them also holds those beliefs, they won’t 
believe that everyone holds those view because everyone else also holds them. Thanks to 
Kristina Lepold for probing me on the social construction view. 
4 Matt Kramer has suggested to me a close connection between prejudicial belief and 
implicit bias. While I agree that there is such a connection, prejudicial belief seems to me 
generally to be held with some degree of awareness of its lack of warrant. By contrast, 
implicit bias generally lies beyond the holder’s conscious epistemic control. Thanks to Fleur 
Jongepier for discussing possible differences between prejudice and implicit bias.  
5 One might take the view that people can holds prejudicial beliefs which they belief to be 
true. I am not sure about this: while we often hold to be true beliefs that are in fact false, it 
seems to me to lie in the nature of a prejudicially held belief that is held in more or less 
conscientious abeyance of the requisite judgement as to its truth or falsity of the belief. 
 4 
false belief, since the proponent of such a belief holds it to be true. Nor, arguably, can 
prejudicial belief be knowingly held false belief – this would require too much conscientious 
self-deception sustained over time. Prejudicial belief may be belief that conscientiously 
refuses to respond to demands as to its warrant. Such refusal may be easier to maintain 
where it is systematically ambiguous whether or not there are plausible grounds for the 
belief. More specifically, socially salient prejudicial beliefs about race may flourish in part 
because the concept’s objective referent is systematically indeterminate: generally held to 
be neither true nor false. In that case, racism as a form of socially salient prejudicial belief is 
not altogether groundless – it rather trades on the ambiguity as to its objective ground. This 
is not to deny Mills’ further point, that the ontological status of the concept does not settle 
its moral salience: it is possible to believe in the existence of different human races and to 
attribute no moral significance to this fact. But from the fact that belief in the existence of 
different human races needn’t engender racist attitudes it does not follow that racist 
attitudes and beliefs are wholly independent of relevant underlying ontological 
commitments, however ambivalently held. In the history of the concept, the morally 
significant hierarchical ranking of the different human races required that disputes about 
the existence of different races remain at least unresolved (Smith 2015).6  
 Mills puts ontological disputes about race aside because he is interested in racial 
justice. From his perspective, race can have social salience even if it lacks real existence. My 
own view is that socially salient beliefs depend on (true or false) ontological commitments 
at least to some extent (hence my scepticism regarding the social construction view). I 
therefore agree with Mills that one should distinguish between social salience and 
ontological commitment. But I do not think one can fruitfully address social salience without 
taking stock of the ways in which current or former ontological commitments continue to 
make race socially salient. That said, my question here is whether philosophical racism may 
have contributed to the rise of social racism. That question arises directly out of the 
ontological dimension of theorizing race: after all, ontological disputes about the existence 
of different human races are philosophical disputes. Although these disputes need not have 
engendered racist attitudes, there clearly is a close connection between the two. At least in 
retrospect we can say that philosophical disputes about the existence of the different races 
did give rise to, or at least supported, racist attitudes and practices, including the Atlantic 
slave trade as well as the subsequent colonial ‘carving up’ of the African continent.7 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Thus conceived, a prejudicial belief is a belief affirmed in awareness of its lack of rational 
support. This means that I do not myself believe that anyone can hold a prejudicial belief 
which they believe to be true, though they can of course hold beliefs which, though they 
believe them to be true, are in fact false. But a false belief is not the same as a prejudicial 
belief. Thanks to Guy Longford for pressing me for clarification on this point.  
6 I do not here mean that it needed to be the case that some believed different races to 
exist while others didn’t – such that the debate remained ‘unresolved’ in the sense of 
continuing to be disputed. Rather, and as will hopefully become clearer below, I mean that 
the debate needed to remain unresolved in the sense that both sides were aware of the fact 
that there was at least as much evidence against the existence of different races as there 
was evidence in favour of it. So ‘unresolved’ in the sense that it remained an open question 
as to whether or not different human races exist.  
7 Racist attitudes do not target peoples of African descent exclusively. Historically, most 
racial hierarchies identified between four to five different racial types; virtually all 
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I should at this point try to be a bit more precise about what I mean by philosophical 
racism as distinct from ordinary or social racism. I suggested that ordinary racism, i.e. belief 
in the moral inferiority of some races compared to others, is now widely regarded as an 
instance of (socially sustained) prejudicial belief. Belief in the inferiority of some races 
compared to others presupposes belief in the existence, in some sense, of different human 
races. I said that, typically, the holder of a prejudicial belief resists the demand for its 
rational warrant. Nonetheless, a prejudicial belief is not held arbitrarily – it claims some sort 
of warrant for itself but refuses to put that warrant to critical test. In the case of race, the 
elusiveness of the concept’s ontological referent offers feeding grounds for racist beliefs.  
If ordinary racist belief is non-arbitrarily held, non-justified belief that thrives on the 
systematic ambiguity regarding the truth or falsity of its ontological ground, it seems 
implausible to characterize philosophical racism as a form of ordinary prejudicial belief. 
Philosophical thinking eschews commitment to beliefs that lack sufficient rational warrant – 
not least at the level of ‘ontological fact’ or ‘first principles’. If ordinary racist belief thrives 
on the ambiguity as to the rational warrant of its ground, and if philosophical thinking 
eschews that kind of ambiguity, philosophical racism cannot take the form of ordinary racist 
belief. Philosophical thinkers can at most commit themselves to the position that the 
question as to inferiority of some of the human races is unsettled given the unsettledness of 
the prior question regarding the existence of different races.  
And yet, in the history of Western philosophy, dominant voices came to the 
conclusion, not that races do exist, but that whether or not they do, moral judgements 
predicated on racial differences are not unwarranted. While the philosophical community 
drew back from affirming the real existence of different races, it nonetheless also 
participated in and indeed fostered moral discrimination based on race. This is the 
conclusion drawn by Justin Smith in his excellent study of the concept’s philosophical 
history: 
 
The project of racial typology went ahead, explicitly on the model of species 
taxonomy, even as its principal contributors insisted that there could be no 
species-like or essential divisions within the human species, to the extent 
that this species consisted entirely in descendants of the same original 
ancestors, and to the extent that speciation was not yet a consideration 
(Smith 2015, p. 256). 
 
There thus was philosophical commitment to the moral inferiority of some races compared 
to others even in the face of the acknowledged unlikely existence of distinct species of 
human beings. We may plausibly diagnose philosophical racism in analogy with ordinary 
racist belief: in both cases, we have the affirmation of prejudicial moral belief that trades on 
the systematic ambiguity regarding its supporting existential ground. Arguably, however, 
philosophical racism is more pernicious than ordinary racist belief. While the latter is 
typically unconcerned about its rational warrant, the former typically claims rational 
                                                                                                                                                                        
consistently listed native Americans as the most depraved, with Africans second-to-last. 
Racist beliefs about peoples of African descent appear nonetheless to have been the most 
persistent philosophically -- either because of the socially even more marginal status of 
indigenous peoples or because of their partial rehabilitation as ‘noble savages’ (Eberle 
2016), or both.    
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warrant for its beliefs. Philosophical expressions of belief in racial superiority therefore carry 
a good deal more authority than do ordinary such expressions. One way of putting it is to 
say that philosophical racism is more pernicious than ordinary racism precisely because it 
elevates mere prejudice to the status of rationally warranted assertability.    
 
  
III. Diagnosing Philosophical Racism 
To the extent to which racism is acknowledged as a philosophical problem in current Anglo-
American philosophy it tends to be treated as a historical problem associated with a 
relatively small number of individual thinkers. Kant is widely cited as a prominent culprit, as 
is Hegel; Locke, Hume, Mill and Marx figure more occasionally.8 The focus on individual 
historical thinkers encourages the belief both that racism in philosophy is a thing of the past 
and that it was in any case largely a matter of personally held prejudice which, even if it 
influenced aspects of those particular thinkers’ philosophical works, does not impugn the 
discipline as a whole. If the possibility of a tradition of philosophical racism were to be 
countenanced, the possibility of its continuing legacies would have to be countenanced also. 
But in order for us to countenance the possibility of a tradition of philosophical racism, we 
would have to stop focusing on particular historical thinkers as exemplifying occasional 
lapses into merely personal prejudice within an otherwise unblemished discipline. We 
would have to think of individual members of the philosophical community as drawing on 
and as sustaining each other in philosophically ingrained beliefs about race, where those 
beliefs are passed on from one generation to the next more or less unthinkingly over an 
appreciable length of historical time.  
In ‘Constructing the Universal: A Trans-Cultural Challenge’, the Beninois philosopher 
and Husserl scholar Paulin Hountondji refers to Husserl’s Vienna lecture of 1935 on 
‘Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity’. Hountondji notes that ‘to show how 
important philosophy is to the spiritual heritage of Europe and how it contributes to 
European identity, Husserl mentions incidentally that while man is a rational animal, and in 
this sense, even the Papuan is a man, philosophical reasoning is specific to European 
humankind’ (Hountondji 2015, p. 2). For Husserl, ‘the Papuan’ is a lesser human being who 
can reason, but not philosophically. Significantly, Hountondji immediately goes on to insist 
that before casting judgement on Husserl’s personal character we should consider the 
audience he was addressing: 
 
However scientific, objective or rational a discourse claims to be, it is always 
directly or indirectly shaped by its potential audience. As a matter of fact, 
none of [the European philosophers] suspected that they could be read some 
day by the Negroes of Africa or the Papuans of New Guinea. They felt free, 
therefore, to talk about the latter without fearing to be contradicted. A 
discourse is partly determined in its content by the actual configuration of 
the discussion circle in which it is performed and by the frontiers, both visible 
and invisible, of this circle. What I say depends on who I am not talking to as 
well as on whom I am addressing (Hountondji 2015, p.3). 
                                                      
8 The prominence of German culprits in recent race debates may reflect Nazi legacies. As 
noted also by Mills, Locke, Hume and Mill – all active supporters of British Empire – figure 
comparatively little these debates.  
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Hountondji here introduces the idea of a philosophical community and of communally 
developed and sustained philosophical beliefs (see also Hountondji 2002). Husserl should 
then be read as issuing a philosophical commonplace about race, not as lapsing into 
personal prejudice. Husserl assumes that everyone in the audience already ‘knows’ that the 
Papuan cannot reason philosophically – the point requires no defense.9 His focus is on the 
philosophical crisis in Europe and here, too, he unselfconsciously invokes a ‘European 
humankind’, delimiting the scope of philosophy’s universality claims – ‘humanity’ – in terms 
of racial membership – ‘European’ (Caucasian). From Husserl’s perspective, which he shares 
with his audience, the Papuan is not being arbitrarily excluded from the philosophical 
community – he simply lies permanently outside its scope. This puts any philosophically 
inclined Papuan in an invidious position. His principled exclusion from the bounds of 
philosophical consideration implicates him in Western philosophical discourses and self-
conceptions – he plays a role in it which, for his own sake, he is obliged to contradict.  At the 
same time, the only way in which the Papuan can contradict members of the philosophical 
community is by engaging it in philosophical argument of a kind recognized as such by that 
community. The Papuan must contradict the philosophical community on the community’s 
terms. Yet those terms explicitly rule out the possibility of a ’Papuan humankind’. To defend 
himself against the charge that he cannot reason philosophically the philosophically inclined 
Papuan must reason as an honorary European; he must train his mind to think about himself 
in terms that discredit his (Papuan) humanity – the very thing he set out to defend. 
 We seem now to have arrived at a more invidious notion of philosophical racism 
according to which it takes the form of the presumptively warranted exclusion of individual 
members of racially defined groups from possible participation in philosophical discourse on 
terms other than the racially compromised terms recognized by the philosophical 
community itself. One may wish to diagnose this phenomenon as a problem of epistemic 
injustice – i.e. as the unjustified exclusion of some from the community of knowers (Fricker 
2009). My worry is that this characterization gets the emphasis wrong: the chief problem is 
not the unjustified exclusion of some from an otherwise unblemished philosophical 
discourse but the community’s racially highly blemished discourse. A discourse cannot raise 
universality claims of the kind typically raised by philosophical discourses whilst arbitrarily 
restricting the scope of its possible participants and addressees.10 It is arbitrary to exclude 
some from participation in discourses on ‘humanity’ on grounds of race. Where this 
                                                      
9 Guy Longford has suggested to me that that such ‘knowledge’ may have drawn support 
from sources other than philosophy, such as the sciences of the day, or anthropology. This is 
highly likely; Longford helpfully goes on to suggest a ‘circle of support’ whereby prejudicial 
beliefs are externally ‘fed into’ philosophical discourses where they receive further 
validation through philosophical uptake. I nonetheless think we should avoid seeking to 
exonerate philosophy as a discipline by pacing the burden on related disciplines. Indeed, 
part of the value of Justin Smith’s work (Smith 2015) lies precisely in his treatment of 
seventeenth century scientific race inquiry as part of a still more integrated form of 
philosophical thinking.  
10 One may object that philosophical claims may be true, hence universally valid, even 
despite the fact that not everyone has been consulted with regard to their status as such. I 
agree, but only on the proviso that no one should in principle be excluded from possible 
contestation of such claimed truths. Thanks to Fleur Jongpier for raising this point. 
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happens the Papuan certainly suffers an injustice; however, and at least equally 
significantly, the philosophical community is in fundamental error about itself: it advances 
universality claims that cannot in principle qualify as such. 
 One may object, ‘what does it mean to say that the Papuan must cease to be 
Papuan? If the Papuan really is Papuan – or even if he only thinks he is – he cannot cease 
being it. He should stand up for being Papuan – he should make a philosophical case for 
being Papuan!’ This objection is not unreasonable: it demands to be shown precisely what 
about (Western) philosophical discourses would be different had Papuans not been 
excluded from them. It is also at this point that contestatory arguments focused on the issue 
of race narrowly construed – essentially, social discrimination based on skin colour – tend to 
struggle to specify what it is about race that is philosophically problematic. Which 
fundamental problems in the history of Western philosophy would have been treated 
differently if the discourse had remained colour-blind? Take Kant. Considered in 
conjunction, Kant’s two early essays on race, the essay ‘On the Beautiful and the Sublime’, 
prominent passages in his early and late teleological essays, and stray remarks in the 
Anthropology amount to a formidable body of evidence in support of Kant’s personal 
racism. But, if it did, in which ways precisely did his racism shape his central philosophical 
concerns? Would his account of the transcendentally necessary structure of the human 
mind have looked substantially different in the absence of his exposure to and participation 
in contemporaneous race debates? How could one even tell? (Eze 2008, chap.1).  
 Modern African philosophy works with an expanded conception of race and of 
racism. It is less narrowly focused on skin colour and related phenotypical features and 
more concerned with the place and function of the idea of Africa within the Western 
philosophical imagination. The focus on Africa as an idea in the Western imagination does 
not render skin colour irrelevant. To the contrary, the long-standing philosophical reception 
of the African continent as culturally, historically, politically and socio-economically 
backward is largely mediated through the concept of race as that fact about Africans that 
centrally accounts for their presumed backwardness. Even the geographical-cum-cultural 
differentiation of Northern Africa from Sub-Saharan African is an implicit colour line as 
much as it is anything else. It would be a mistake, therefore, to treat modern African 
philosophical attempts at cultural retrieval and rehabilitation as an endeavor that has no 
bearing on the issue of race. Quite the reverse: to the extent to which Western 
philosophical perceptions of the African continent as backward are racially mediated, it may 
be possible to gain traction on manifestations of philosophical racism by considering 
domains of human experience that are judged by the philosophical community to fall 
outside the purview of philosophical inquiry merely in virtue of their sub-Saharan 
provenance.  
The work of the Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu is exemplary in this regard. 
Wiredu addresses African philosophical audiences primarily and Western ones secondarily. 
In several of his writings he enumerates stocks of concepts that are defining of the Western 
philosophical canon and which African philosophy students continue to be inducted into as 
a matter of colonially inherited humanities curricula. Yet while generally assumed to stake 
out the philosophical territory per se, these concepts frequently fail to resonate 
appropriately within ordinary African languages and experiences. Wiredu challenges fellow 
African thinkers to  
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think of the possible enormity of the philosophical deadwood we may be 
carrying through our historically enforced acquisition of philosophical training 
in the medium of foreign languages. There are many [such concepts], but let 
me mention only the following: Reality, Being, Existence, Thing, Object, 
Entity, Substance, Property, Quality, Fact, Truth, Mind, Soul, Spirit….(Wiredu 
1996, p. 137). 
 
 Wiredu’s list of suspected philosophical deadwood is so long that one begins to 
wonder whether he is not exaggerating. Still, a moment’s reflection shows individual terms 
on the list to be intimately bound up with others; commitment to one will typically entail 
commitment to a string of others: mind and soul, truth and fact, being and substance. On 
the one hand, the construction of philosophical reality on the basis of a web of imported 
philosophical concepts requires the African philosopher to lead a double-life in which her 
philosophical concerns touch little if at all on her surrounding social realities: this 
conundrum implicitly confirms Husserl’s claim that Western philosophical thinking 
addresses European humankind exclusively. On the other hand, the conundrum also shows 
up what Wiredu identifies as the problem of ‘false universals’ – i.e. these concepts’ failure 
to meet the test of their universalizability. In the present context, the critical point is the 
following: Wiredu diagnoses the conundrum from within dominant terms of European 
philosophical discourse. Trained at Oxford in the late 1950s, he employs the tools of 
ordinary language analysis to demonstrate that many of the concepts that resonate 
philosophically in ordinary English fail to do so in Akan languages (Wiredu 2004, Wiredu 
2006). It is thus by their own methodological criterion that the listed concepts fail the 
universalizability test. 
 Wiredu’s work (about which more would need to be said in more detail) is one 
example of an African thinker taking up the challenge of showing ways in which the Papuan 
has to disavow his Papuan humanity in order to participate in philosophical discourses on 
the relevant community’s terms: he has to induct himself into a set of philosophically 
established concepts that preclude him from meaningful philosophical engagement with 
Papuan social and moral realities. This will of course tend to confirm the presumption that 
Papuan social and moral realities are themselves devoid of philosophical interest. Skin 
colour need not figure explicitly in such discriminatory discourses; it suffices for it to inform 
unstated background assumptions about which contexts and domains of human experience 
are or are not worthy of philosophical reflection. By the same token, disavowals of racist 
beliefs based merely on explicit discrimination by skin colour will not in themselves 
safeguard us against inherited commitment to philosophically racist forms of thought and 
beliefs.  
There is nonetheless also a second, more constructive aspect to Wiredu’s 
deflationary strategy in relation to Western universalising ambitions. While his work 
addresses African thinkers’ concern to close the gap between philosophical thinking and 
African social realities, it equally seeks to encourage intercultural philosophical exchange by 
way of employing methods of analysis that are accessible to those whose philosophical 
exclusivity Wiredu is concerned to show up. The thought is that insofar as any number of 
Western philosophical concepts can be shown to lack the universality of scope typically 
claimed in their behalf, both philosophical communities – African and Western – have 
reason to engage in a common search for possible ‘true universals’. Much of Wiredu’s work 
is thus conducted along the frontier of both philosophical communities – he seeks to foster 
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the emergence of a modern African philosophical tradition capable of engaging with and of 
expanding the horizons of Western philosophical traditions. 
 
IV. Responding to Philosophical Racism 
Wiredu’s work provides one example of how one might go about identifying instances of 
philosophical racism within Western traditions of thought. Philosophical racism in the form 
of racially or culturally restricted concepts and forms of thought denies Africans and 
people(s) of African descent exploration of the possible context-transcending relevance of 
their distinctive moral and epistemic experiences, thereby denying them possible 
contribution to reflection on and enrichment of the human condition in general. The social 
consequences of such intellectual exclusion are palpable: one need only think of the impact 
on black (and white!) British youth of the virtually complete absence in the national 
humanities curriculum of works by persons of African descent – surely an educational 
scandal in post-imperial, nominally multi-cultural, nominally Commonwealth Britain.11 
Hume’s presumption that blackness is a sure sign of mindlessness, and Hegel’s claim that 
Africa has no history remain very much with us today notwithstanding widespread rejection, 
as socially unjust, of discrimination based on skin colour. 
 As noted, part of the value of Wiredu’s approach to philosophical racism lies in its 
showing the latter to be a problem for Western philosophical thinking also. It is not just 
(descendants of) Africans who suffer the negative effects of intellectual exclusion on 
grounds of race; the identification of ‘false universals’ evidences the race-based distortion 
of Western traditions’ philosophical self-conceptions. One may object that Wiredu’s claims 
in this regard are too grandiose to be plausible. Philosophy as it is done today – academic 
philosophy – is quite a modest affair. It typically concerns itself with highly specialist and 
often local puzzles and problems that are internal to methodologically disparate strands 
within what is here carelessly lumped together as ‘the Western tradition’. Academic 
philosophical thinking today, being highly specialized, does not typically trade in grand 
universals – at best, Wiredu’s analysis is conducted at too high a level of abstraction to be 
genuinely informative.12  
The objection may be accurate so far as its description of contemporary academic 
philosophy goes. I am less persuaded that it accurately captures the discipline’s self-
conception. In general, it is hard to think that the activity referred to as ‘philosophy’ does 
not take the distinctiveness of its endeavours to lie in the quest for some kind of context-
transcending ‘truth’ or universality of reach. The doubtless innumerable hives of intricately 
small-scale, specialized philosophical activities are still meant to build up to a larger picture 
of what there is and of how things ought to be – if only teleologically so. 
 This is not to deny the practical problems associated with any attempts at a 
discipline-wide response to, and amelioration of, philosophical racism. One may agree that, 
as a general observation about the distance between aspiration and practice, Wiredu’s 
analysis has much to be said in its favour: Western philosophical theories have raised plenty 
                                                      
11 In British state schools, contributions by persons of African descent continue to be 
ghettoized in the ritualistically performed ‘black history month’ that reduces to annual 
repetitions of the experience of slavery and the struggle against it. I am in no position to 
judge whether British public schools operate with a more inclusive curriculum in this 
respect. 
12 Thanks to Herman van Cappelen for raising this objection with me. 
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of universality claims that have retrospectively turned out to be unwarranted along many 
pertinent dimensions – race being just one of them. But even if one concedes the general 
point, what can follow from it with regard to present and future philosophical practice 
given, not least, the ever-increasing division of philosophical labour? Is no area of inquiry 
going to count as bona fide philosophical that has not passed some retrospectively 
designed, discipline-wide ‘anti-racism test’?13 That would be neither realistic nor desirable: 
for one thing, what does or does not count as racist thought is in any case a moving and 
ever evolving target; for another, blanket anti-racist prescriptivism is unlikely to result in 
anything other than intellectually stymying veneers of ‘political correctness’. 
 One alternative may lie in confining the problem of racism – and hence the solution 
to it – to particularly pertinent areas of philosophical inquiry. Given their general subject-
matter, moral and political philosophy may be thought to be both more liable to 
perpetrating racist thinking and better equipped to respond to it. Other areas of 
philosophical inquiry are much further removed from being racially implicated: metaphysics, 
perhaps, or epistemology. I hope to have said enough in the foregoing sections to close off 
that strategy of response: at least historically, metaphysics (ontology) and epistemology are 
no less racially implicated than are branches of practical philosophy. 
 In light of the respective limitations of the two foregoing proposals, let me instead 
propose the following research maxim: whilst, in the age of specialization, we cannot expect 
uniform philosophical reform to occur everywhere simultaneously within the discipline, we 
should each seek out opportunities for reform anywhere within the discipline.14 No area of 
philosophical inquiry is in principle immune from opportunities for greater inclusiveness 
even if the form and timing of reform will unavoidably differ from sub-field to sub-field. In 
general, we will have to rely on opportunities for philosophical reform being identified and 
taken up by individual thinkers. Hence the emphasis on a research maxim: my willingness to 
acknowledge that my thinking in relation to a given philosophical problem area may be less 
colour-blind than I would like it to be and my preparedness, in the face of that possibility, to 
read a little more widely or think a little more self-critically than I might otherwise do, 
cannot emanate in my behalf from anyone but myself.  
Again, one may expect reasonable resistance to this proposal. Surely, it may be 
objected, the wider institutional setting would itself have to become more hospitable to the 
proposed research maxim. There would have to be greater tolerance for methodological 
diversity as well as greater tolerance with regard to what can count as a problem of 
substantive philosophical interest. Top journals would have to widen their intellectual remit, 
teaching institutions would have to be open to curriculum reform. But will greater tolerance 
not broaden the remit and, in consequence, push down disciplinary standards? Take 
contemporary analytic philosophy: it is not exactly renowned for its methodological open-
mindedness. To the contrary, it prides itself on jealously guarded high standards of clarity, 
precision, and rigour. Are the floodgates to be opened? No one denies that standards must 
be maintained; nor is methodological distinctiveness in itself a bad thing. Still, there is a fine 
line between maintaining standards on the one hand and intellectual narrow-mindedness 
on the other, and a fine line, too, between methodological rigour on the one hand and the 
power to exclude on the other.  
                                                      
13 Thanks to Diarmuid Costello for pressing me on this. 
14 The inspiration behind the proposed maxim is Kant’s footnote remark on permissive laws 
in ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’, at 8: 348. 
 12 
In the end, of course, the problem of institutional inhospitality runs both much 
deeper and much wider, exceeding disciplinary boundaries. Our inability to see certain 
forms of thought and substantive beliefs as genuinely philosophical ones may be related as 
much to the fact that we have already accorded them a place elsewhere within the 
disciplinary matrix. An example will illustrate this. At a recent session in my new course on 
modern African philosophy we examined Segun Gbadegesin’s analysis of the Yoruba 
conception of personal destiny (Gbadegesin 2006). The analysis takes its point of departure 
in the Ifa allegory of persons’ antenatal choice of their destiny. Students struggled to read 
the allegory as raising potentially universal questions about the extent and limits of personal 
responsibility; to them, it was an account of what members of traditional Yoruba 
communities happen to believe about themselves. Yet the same students had no difficulty 
reading Plato’s allegory of the cave or Rawls’ original position account non-
anthropologically.  
Evidently, the fault lies not with the students; it lies with the ways in which we 
classify and teach sources of human significance and meaning. This goes to show that 
individual research maxim and institutional background context are not neatly separable. 
We cannot each wait for institutions to become more tolerant before we ourselves venture 
into intellectually new territory. We can counteract our institutionally incurred inability to 
read Ifa verses in other than anthropological terms only by resolving to read them 
philosophically, i.e. by resolving to treat their potential for universal significance as no less, 
at least antecedently, than that of Plato’s cave or Rawls’ original positon. 
 
V. Philosophical Racism and Racial Justice 
I began with the worry that confining our attention to the problem of racial injustice risks 
overlooking the problem of philosophical racism. Philosophical discussions about racial 
injustice assume that the discipline is capable of offering theoretical solutions to it; my 
argument has been that our inherited terms of philosophical discourse are themselves a 
likely source of the problem. In making this argument, I have worked with an expanded 
conception of ‘racism’ -- one that does not focus on skin-colour so much as on a historically 
and culturally entrenched conception of ‘Africa’ as a place with no history, no civilization, no 
forms of thought, no reflections on universal meaning. That perception is intimately related 
to the blackness of the continent’s inhabitants; nonetheless, working with a broader 
conception of racism helps to show just how pervasive the problem is for people(s) of 
African descent who suffer discrimination not just on account of skin colour but also, albeit 
relatedly, on cultural, intellectual and historical grounds. By the same token, working with 
such a broader notion of race and racism shows that implicitly held racist attitudes or biases 
are not eliminated merely by rejecting social discrimination based on skin colour alone. 
 My own view is that the problem of philosophical racism is prior to, or at any rate an 
integral part of, the problem of social racism. Ever increasing sub-disciplinary specialisation 
notwithstanding, philosophy as a humanistic discipline retains its responsibility as guide to 
public belief at least to some extent. It would be odd for us to engage in disquisitions about 
racial justice without in so doing turning the discipline’s critical lens upon itself. This is not to 
say that greater cultural-cum-racial inclusiveness in philosophical thinking suffices to resolve 
problems of racial injustice – still, without it there is no hope that the latter is resolvable at 
all. This is well understood among representatives of student bodies the world over, with 
calls for a less ‘Eurocentric’ university curriculum in the UK, the US, South Africa, to name 
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but a few such sites. The problem identified by Wiredu in relation to post-colonial African 
societies holds just as much for post-colonial Britain, Europe and for post-slavery US: 
 
The African youth, more or less bereft of the security of traditional 
orthodoxies, stands in need of a new philosophy. But what philosophy should 
the modern African live by? (Wiredu 1980, p.30) 
 
Mills and I do not, I think, disagree on the general view expressed in this last 
paragraph. Perhaps we disagree on where to put the emphasis, i.e., whether on social or on 
intellectual reform. Evidently, we disagree on nomenclature, given my reluctance to frame 
the problem of race exclusively or even predominantly as an issue of justice. Perhaps I 
simply suffer from justice fatigue: social justice, global justice, transitional justice, 
rectificatory justice, gender justice, epistemic justice, racial justice…. It is of course good to 
be so unequivocally on the side of what is just and fair: but can we even any longer be 
confident what that might mean in relation to any of these mentioned domains? Oddly – or 
perhaps reassuringly (at least for me) -- Mills is driven to similar conclusions. Having 
promised the ‘boringly reformist’ liberal egalitarian route at the outset of his article, Mills’ 
intervening tour de force on the historical and conceptual complexities of ‘race’ seems in 
the end to leave him, too, doubtful whether one really can marshal the Rawlsian framework 
to the project of racial justice. Mills charges that Rawls’ failure, over three decades, to move 
from ideal theory to non-ideal theory has resulted ‘in a liberalism that ignores its own 
history of racism’. He says that, from the African-American perspective, the contractualist 
notion of social inclusion by consent would have to be replaced with a notion of inclusion by 
coercion, and he insists that ‘we require principles of corrective justice sensitized to the 
experience of racial subordination’. Agreed. But can a restatement of the Rawlsian original 
position argument – even a radically altered one – really deliver on all or any of this? If the 
line of argument here pursued is plausible it is more likely that the terms in which the 
problem of liberal justice is framed themselves require critical examination. Besides, how 
many times can we repeat versions of the same thought experiment and hope to come 
away with fresh, theoretically untutored insights? The original position argument can tap 
our intuitions once or twice but eventually the thing will go stale. While Mills is right to 
insist that racial justice is urgent and long overdue, and not just in the United States, I am 
doubtful that Rawls’ thought experiment, original though it originally was, can give us fresh 
insights into what racial justice might mean or require. In sum, I have (at least) two worries 
in relation to drawing on Rawls for the project of racial justice: one, the thought experiment 
has been reiterated too many times for it to yield genuinely new insights, and two, 
unexamined terms of the Rawlsian framework may themselves be racially implicated. With 
regard to the relation between racial justice and philosophical racism, I will similarly 
conclude with two points: one, philosophy should not overestimate its capacity to reform 
social institutions by way of theoretical policy advice; two, it should not underestimate its 
capacity to contribute to social reform by enabling us to think differently about our 
historically inherited intellectual nexus between race, culture, philosophy and the 
humanities more generally.15     
                                                      
15 I would like to thank Guy Longford for helpful comments on the penultimate version of 
this article. Many thanks, further, for generous comments on earlier versions of this article 
to participants at the following venues: Philosophy Seminar, University of Oslo, December 
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